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Abstract
Background:  Clearly air travel, by transporting infectious individuals from one geographic
location to another, significantly affects the rate of spread of influenza A (H1N1). However, the
possibility of within-flight transmission of H1N1 has not been evaluated; although it is known that
smallpox, measles, tuberculosis, SARS and seasonal influenza can be transmitted during commercial
flights. Here we present the first quantitative risk assessment to assess the potential for within-flight
transmission of H1N1.
Methods: We model airborne transmission of infectious viral particles of H1N1 within a Boeing
747 using methodology from the field of quantitative microbial risk assessment.
Results: The risk of catching H1N1 will essentially be confined to passengers travelling in the same
cabin as the source case. Not surprisingly, we find that the longer the flight the greater the number
of infections that can be expected. We calculate that H1N1, even during long flights, poses a low
to moderate within-flight transmission risk if the source case travels First Class. Specifically, 0-1
infections could occur during a 5 hour flight, 1-3 during an 11 hour flight and 2-5 during a 17 hour
flight. However, within-flight transmission could be significant, particularly during long flights, if the
source case travels in Economy Class. Specifically, two to five infections could occur during a 5 hour
flight, 5-10 during an 11 hour flight and 7-17 during a 17 hour flight. If the aircraft is only partially
loaded, under certain conditions more infections could occur in First Class than in Economy Class.
During a 17 hour flight, a greater number of infections would occur in First Class than in Economy
if the First Class Cabin is fully occupied, but Economy class is less than 30% full.
Conclusions: Our results provide insights into the potential utility of air travel restrictions on
controlling influenza pandemics in the winter of 2009/2010. They show travel by one infectious
individual, rather than causing a single outbreak of H1N1, could cause several simultaneous
outbreaks. These results imply that, during a pandemic, quarantining passengers who travel in
Economy on long-haul flights could potentially be an important control strategy. Notably, our
results show that quarantining passengers who travel First Class would be unlikely to be an effective
control strategy.
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Background
Clearly air travel, by transporting infectious individuals
from the epicentre in Mexico to other geographic loca-
tions, significantly affected the rate of spread of influenza
A (H1N1). However, the possibility of within-flight trans-
mission of H1N1 has not been evaluated, although it is
known that smallpox, measles, tuberculosis, SARS and
seasonal influenza can be transmitted during commercial
flights [1]. These pathogens can be transmitted both by
direct contact with large respiratory droplets and by air-
borne transmission of small, aerosolized droplets [2-4].
Several recent empirical studies have attempted to deter-
mine which mode of transmission is the most important
for influenza. Fabian et al. [2] conducted studies of sea-
sonal strains to measure the concentration of influenza
RNA viral particles exhaled by infected patients. In their
study, infected patients exhaled into an Exhalair, a device
that collects and counts viral particles in exhaled breath,
and the concentration of RNA viral copies was measured
in Teflon filters. It was found that 33% of infected humans
exhaled droplets containing influenza. Lowen et al. [3]
have experimentally determined that influenza can be
transmitted amongst guinea pigs by droplet and/or aero-
sol spread. In these experiments the guinea pigs were inoc-
ulated intranasally and viral samples were collected from
nasal washes of their upper and lower respiratory tracts.
Viral growth was determined to occur in their lungs and
nasal passages, establishing the guinea pig as a model host
for droplet infection. Lowen et al. [3] also found airborne
and droplet transmission could occur between animals by
conducting experiments in which they placed infected
and non-infected guinea pigs in the same cage, adjacent
cages and separated cages at least 90 cm apart [3]. A simi-
lar and more recent experimental study using ferrets has
shown that H1N1 can be transmitted by aerosolized drop-
lets. Although several studies have shown that H1N1
appears to have similar infectivity as seasonal strains the
importance of airborne transmission of H1N1 in humans
has not yet been definitively established [4-6]. However,
it should be noted that airborne transmission of seasonal
strains of influenza during a flight, particularly if ventila-
tion is poor, can be significant. As an extreme example,
one individual infected with a strain of influenza A man-
aged to infect 72% of passengers during a 3 hour flight on
a plane without ventilation [7]. By assuming that H1N1
has a similar infectivity to that of seasonal strains, we cal-
culated the expected number of H1N1 infections that one
source case could cause during an international flight.
Typically, the number of infected individuals that can be
expected during a large scale outbreak or epidemic is
determined by calculating the basic reproduction number
(R0) [8]. R0 is defined as the average number of secondary
infections caused by one infectious individual in a popu-
lation of susceptible individuals during the time in which
they are infectious. Therefore, R0 is a useful measure for
predicting the number of infections that could be
expected to occur during a large-scale outbreak or an epi-
demic. However, R0 is not a useful measure for predicting
the number of infections that one infectious individual
could cause over a few hours in a confined space. In this
case, the number of secondary infections is best predicted
using methods from the field of quantitative microbial
risk assessment. These are the methods that we have used
in our analysis. Specifically, we have used the classic
Wells-Riley equation [9] to estimate the number of pas-
sengers that could become infected with H1N1 during a
commercial flight, assuming one infectious case is on
board. The Wells-Riley equation was developed over 30
years ago [9] and is now the standard methodology for
predicting (for infectious pathogens that have airborne
transmission) the size of outbreaks within buildings and
other enclosed environments.
The Wells-Riley equation is based on the number of
exposed individuals, the respiratory rate of the source
case, the length of exposure to the infectious droplets and
the concentration of infectious viral particles over time.
Within an aircraft the concentration of infectious viral
particles over time is determined by the ventilation rates,
the volume of the cabins in the aircraft and the infectious-
ness of the index case. In the field of quantitative micro-
bial risk assessment, infectiousness is quantified by
measuring the number of infectious particles that an
infected individual expels per litre of air. Infectivity is
expressed in terms of infectious quanta; a measure
defined by William Wells in 1934 [10]. Wells used the
Poisson distribution to express the relationship between
dosage and infection; he defined a quantum to be the
number of infectious droplet nuclei required to infect 1 -
1/e  (that is, 63%) of exposed susceptible individuals.
Quanta are now a standard measure for expressing the risk
of infection with airborne pathogens and have been used
extensively to characterize the infectivity of seasonal stains
of influenza [2,11,12]. Rates of quanta production for
influenza have been estimated by both direct and indirect
means. Indirect infectivity estimates have been made
using back calculation based on outbreaks in environ-
ments with little or no ventilation [12]. Specifically, Rud-
nick and Milton [12] used data from an influenza
outbreak on a grounded plane with very limited ventila-
tion and a single source case (see Moser et al. [7]) to back
calculate the rate of quantum generation for a highly
infectious case of influenza. Direct measurements of
quanta production rates have been made by determining
the rate at which infectious individuals exhale RNA virus
copies [2]. This is practically accomplished by measuring
the RNA virus concentration in Teflon filters in conjunc-
tion with an individual's rate of respiration [2].BMC Medicine 2009, 7:81 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/81
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Methods
During a flight, transmission of influenza due to direct
contact is very limited because passengers remain seated,
and therefore we only model airborne transmission. We
used a sequential box model [5] to calculate the temporal
concentration of infectious droplets (quanta) of H1N1 in
a transatlantic airliner with four cabins: First Class, Upper
Deck Business Class, Lower Deck Business Class and
Economy Class. The sequential box model was developed
in the 1980s by Ryan et al. [13]. It is a standard method for
estimating the concentration of infectious particles in
confined environments. The model calculates concentra-
tion based on volume of air in each cabin, rate of inflow
of air from outside the aircraft, proportion of air recycled
during the flight, efficiency of filters in purifying recycled
air and strain infectivity. In all our calculations we assume
that the index case is symptomatic. If the index case is
asymptomatic they would expel very few infectious viri-
ons and, hence, would be very unlikely to cause any infec-
tions during a flight.
Our sequential box model is specified by four equations,
one equation for each cabin in the aircraft. The model
assumes that the air in each cabin is well mixed. It enables
us to track the concentration of infectious quanta of
H1N1 (C) in each of the four cabins, over time t. The sub-
script to C signifies the cabin class: 1 = First Class; 2 =
Upper Deck Business Class; 3 = Lower Deck Business
Class; and 4 = Economy Class. The sequential box model
and the airflow between cabins in the plane are shown
diagrammatically in Figure 1. The model is given in terms
of a system of ordinary differential equations as:
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The Sequential Box Model (SBM) that we used to determine the temporal concentration of infectious droplets of H1N1 in four  cabins (C1, C2, C3 and C4) in a commercial airliner (specifically, in a Boeing 747) Figure 1
The Sequential Box Model (SBM) that we used to determine the temporal concentration of infectious droplets 
of H1N1 in four cabins (C1, C2, C3 and C4) in a commercial airliner (specifically, in a Boeing 747). Within the air-
craft air diffuses between adjacent cabins (forward flow fi and backward flow bi) and is removed and replaced by an air supply 
system. Air is replaced by outside air and by air that has been re-circulated through a HEPA filter.BMC Medicine 2009, 7:81 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/81
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We model four scenarios, with one infectious individual
(index case) in each of the four cabins. The parameter qi
represents the rate of production of infectious quanta of
H1N1 in cabin i. The subscript to q signifies the cabin
class. If there is no infectious individual in a cabin i then
qi is set equal to zero. The infectivity of H1N1 is currently
unknown. However, empirical data indicate that it
appears to be equally (or slightly less) transmissible than
seasonal strains of influenza [5,6]. Therefore, in each sce-
nario we varied the quanta production rate of the index
case (qi) from 50 to 128 quanta/hour, based on infectivity
estimates for seasonal strains of influenza [2,7,12].
The remaining parameters in the model characterize the
environmental conditions in the plane. We parameterized
the model to reflect the environmental conditions in a
Boeing 747 airliner; parameter values were obtained from
Boeing [14]. The rate of forward airflow between adjacent
cabins is represented by (fj j = 1...3) and the rate of back-
wards airflow by (bj j = 2...4); fi, bi = 61 m3/h for all i. Air
is removed from each of the four cabins at rate RFj j = 1...4;
RF1 = 3308 m3/h, RF2 = 2462 m3/h, RF3 = 2284 m3/h and
RF4 = 11,679 m3/h. A proportion of the removed air (r) is
filtered with efficacy α and then re-circulated: r = 0.5, α =
0.993. A proportion 1-r of the removed air is replaced by
air outside the aircraft; the function G(C1, C2, C3, C4) com-
putes the concentration of infectious quanta in the re-cir-
culated air. The parameter Vj represents the volume of air
in each of the four cabin classes: V1 = 133 m3, V2 = 99 m3/
h, V3 = 116 m3/h and V4 = 468 m3/h.
We then used the Wells-Riley equation [9] to calculate Ii
(the number of passengers who could be infected in each
of i cabins during a flight of duration T) where the equa-
tion is specified as:
where Ni represents the number of passengers in cabin i
and  ρ  represents the volumetric breathing rate of the
source case (ρ = 0.3 m3/h) [15]. We obtained estimates for
Ci(t), i = 1...4 by integrating our sequential box model.  
We set the number of exposed individuals to reflect occu-
pancy in a Boeing 747 operating at full capacity: 23 pas-
sengers in First Class; 40 in Upper Deck Business Class; 40
in Lower Deck Business Class; and 313 in Economy. We
varied the length of exposure to the H1N1 virus (that is,
flight duration) from 5 hours to 11 hours to 17 hours.
Results
We calculate that the risk of catching H1N1 will, essen-
tially, be confined to passengers travelling in the same
cabin as the source case. We found that this result holds
across the entire range of infectiousness (q) that we con-
sidered. If q is even lower (that is, the source case is even
less infectious than we have assumed) transmission to
other cabins would be even less likely. Since we have
assumed that the air in each cabin is well mixed, individ-
uals in the same cabin will have the same risk of infection.
Not surprisingly, we find that the longer the flight the
greater the number of infections that may be expected
(Figure 2). Our results also show that the greater the infec-
tivity of the source case, the greater the effect of flight
duration on increasing the number of infections (Figure
2). This occurs regardless of whether the source case is
travelling in Economy or First Class; our results for Busi-
ness Class are between those for First Class and Economy
Class and are not shown.
We calculate that, because of the increased seating capac-
ity of Economy Class, there is a higher probability (75%)
that the infectious case will be travelling in Economy
rather than in Business (10%) or First Class (5%). There-
fore, in general, individuals travelling in Economy are
always likely to be at greater risk of infection with H1N1
than individuals travelling in Business or First Class.
Our modelling clearly shows that the location of the
source case will have a significant effect on the number of
infections that occur during a flight (Figure 2). If the plane
is completely occupied, a single infectious individual in
Economy Class will cause more infections that a source
case in First Class (Figure 2). We calculate that H1N1,
even during long flights, poses a low to moderate within-
flight transmission risk if the source case travels First
Class. Specifically, 0-1 infections could occur during a 5
hour flight, 1-3 during an 11 hour flight and 2-5 during a
17 hour flight (Figure 2). However, our results show that
within-flight transmission could be significant, particu-
larly during long flights, if the source case travels in Econ-
omy Class. Specifically, 2-5 infections could occur during
a 5 hour flight, 5-10 during an 11 hour flight and 7-17
during a 17 hour flight (Figure 2). More infections would
occur in the Economy Class than in Business or First Class
because the majority of the passengers travel in Economy
and that section has the smallest volume of air per passen-
ger. However, if the aircraft is only partially loaded, under
certain conditions, more infections could occur in First
Class than in Economy Class. For example, we calculate
that, during a 17 hour flight, a greater number of infec-
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tions would occur in First Class than in Economy if the
First Class Cabin is fully occupied but Economy class is
less than 30% full.
Conclusions
Our modelling has shown (for the first time) that signifi-
cant H1N1 transmission could be occurring during air
travel. Our results have been obtained from a model
parameterized for a Boeing 747. However, our results are
generally applicable to other transatlantic aircraft with
similar size cabins (in terms of seating capacity and vol-
ume) which may have different configurations. In order to
obtain our results we only modelled the risk of acquiring
H1N1 based on airborne infection. During a flight, trans-
mission due to direct contact is very limited because pas-
sengers remain seated. If the virus is also transmitted by
large respiratory droplets (through direct contact) then
the risks of infection that we have calculated will be
underestimates and passengers in close proximity to the
source case will be at greatest risk. We recommend that
more detailed models of within-aircraft transmission of
H1N1 are developed in order to investigate these issues.
These models could be used to investigate the potential
effectiveness of interventions such as the use of facial
masks for symptomatic individuals.
We have demonstrated how methodology from the field
of quantitative microbial risk assessment can be used to
The expected number of H1N1 infections caused by a single infectious case as a function of flight duration and strain infectivity Figure 2
The expected number of H1N1 infections caused by a single infectious case as a function of flight duration and 
strain infectivity. Figure 2a) shows the expected number of infections if the source case is traveling First Class, and Figure 
2b) shows the expected number of infections if the source case is traveling in Economy. The three curves in Figures 2a) and 2b) 
represent different flight durations which are respectively; 5 hrs (solid blue), 11 hrs (dashed red), and 17 hrs (dashed-dot 
black).
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assess the importance of air travel on the global spread of
H1N1. We used infectivity estimates from studies of sea-
sonal strains of influenza to parameterize our model as
several studies have now shown that H1N1 appears to
have similar infectivity to seasonal strains [5,6]. We rec-
ommend, that in order to obtain further insights into the
risks of acquiring influenza during air travel, the infectiv-
ity of all known strains of influenza (including H1N1)
should be measured in terms of quanta/hour. In addition,
we recommend estimating the infectivity of new strains of
influenza as soon as they appear. As we have discussed in
the introduction of this paper, there are already estab-
lished methods for estimating infectivity. These methods
measure infectivity in terms of infectious quanta by meas-
uring virus RNA concentrations in exhaled respiratory
droplets of infectious individuals [2].
Several mathematical models for predicting the potential
spread and magnitude of a global pandemic of H1N1
have recently been published [16,17]. These large-scale
models link H1N1 epidemics in different geographic
regions by moving infectious individuals from place to
place using air travel networks. They do not include the
potential for transmission to occur during air travel. Based
on our results, we suggest that hierarchical multi-scale net-
work models are needed to more accurately predict the
global dissemination of H1N1. Such models would
expand on the current large-scale models based on air
travel networks by linking them to small-scale models of
H1N1 transmission within an aircraft. Such models
would be hierarchical in nature as the small-scale models
would be subcomponents of the large-scale models.
Our results have important implications for understand-
ing and predicting the global dissemination of H1N1.
They provide important insights into the potential utility
of air travel restrictions on controlling influenza pandem-
ics. We have shown that one infectious passenger could
cause a significant number of H1N1 infections during
long flights, particularly if they are travelling in Economy
Class. These results imply that one individual travelling by
plane, by infecting other travellers on the same flight,
could cause multiple simultaneous outbreaks in different
geographic locations rather than causing only one out-
break. Hence, quarantining passengers who travel in
Economy Class on long-haul flights could potentially be
an important control strategy in the winter of 2009/2010.
Notably, our results show that quarantining passengers
who travel First Class would be unlikely to be an effective
control strategy.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors' contributions
BGW, BJC and SB developed the concept and study
design, analyzed and interpreted the data and drafted the
manuscript. BGW and BJC conducted mathematical anal-
yses. SB supervised the project.
Acknowledgements
We thank Meagan Barrett, Justin Okano and Tim Pylko for useful discus-
sions. We gratefully acknowledge NIAID/NIH (BGW, BJC and SB) and the 
John Simon Guggenheim Foundation (SB) for financial support. The spon-
sors had no role in the design and conduct of the study; in the collection, 
management, analysis, and interpretation of the data; or in the preparation, 
review or approval of the manuscript.
References
1. Mangili A, Gendreau MA: Transmission of infectious diseases
during commercial air travel.  Lancet 2005, 365:989-996.
2. Fabian P, McDevitt JJ, DeHaan WH, Fung RO, Cowling BJ, Chan KH,
Leung GM, Milton DK: Influenza virus in human exhaled breath:
an observational study.  PLoS ONE 2008, 3:e2691.
3. Lowen AC, Mubareka S, Tumpey T, Garcia-Sastre A, Palese P: The
guinea pig as a transmission model for human influenza
viruses.  Proc Natl Acad Sci 2006, 103:9988-9992.
4. Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Investigation Team, Dawood
FS, Jain S, Finelli L, Shaw M, Lindstrom S, Garten RJ, Gubareva LV,
Bridges CB, Uyeki TM: Emergence of a novel swine-origin influ-
enza A (H1N1) virus in humans.  N Engl J Med 2009,
25:2605-2615.
5. Munster VJ, de Wit E, van den Brand JMA, Herfst S, Schrauwen EJA,
Bestebroer TM, van de Vijver D, Boucher CA, Koopmans M, Rim-
melzwaan GF, et al.: Pathogenesis and transmission of swine-
origin 2009 A(H1N1) Influenza virus in ferrets.  Science 2009,
325:481-483.
6. Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchemez S, Hanage WP, Van Kerkhove
MD, Hollingsworth TD, Griffin J, Baggaley RF, Jenkins HE, Lyons EJ, et
al.: Pandemic potential of a strain of influenza, A (H1N1):
early findings.  Science 2009, 19:1557-1561.
7. Moser MR, Bender TR, Margolis HS, Noble GR, Kendal AP, Ritter
DG: An outbreak of influenza aboard a commercial airliner.
Am J Epidemiol 1979, 110:1-6.
8. Anderson RM, May RM: Infectious Diseases of Humans Oxford: Oxford
Science Publications; 1991. 
9. Riley EC, Murphy G, Riley RL: Airborne spread of measles in a
suburban elementary school.  Am J Epidemiol 1978, 107:421-432.
10. Wells WF: On air-borne infection: II--Droplets and droplet
nuclei.  Am J Hyg 1934, 20:611-618.
11. Liao CM, Chang CF, Liang HM: A probabilistic transmission
dynamic model to assess indoor airborne infection risks.  Risk
Anal 2005, 25:1097-1107.
12. Rudnick SN, Milton DK: Risk of indoor airborne infection trans-
mission estimated from carbon dioxide concentration.  Indoor
Air 2003, 13:237-245.
13. Ryan PB, Spengler JD, Halfpenny PF: Sequential box models for
indoor air quality: Application to airliner cabin air quality.
Atmospheric Environment 1988, 22:1031-1038.
14. Boeing 747 Famiy: Technical Information   [http://www.boe
ing.com/commercial/747family/specs.html]
15. Vander AJ, Sherman JH, Luciano DS: Human Physiology.  New
York: McGraw-Hill; 1994. 
16. Khan K, Arino J, Hu W, Raposo P, Sears J, Calderon F, Heidebrecht
C, Macdonald M, Liauw J, Chan A, Gardam M: Spread of a novel
influenza A (H1N1) virus via global airline transportation.  N
Engl J Med 2009, 361:212-240.
17. Balcan D, Hu H, Goncalves B, Bajardi P, Poletto C, Ramasco JJ, Paol-
otti D, Perra N, Tizzoni M, Broeck W Van den, et al.: Seasonal
transmission potential and activity peaks of the new influ-
enza A(H1N1): a Monte Carlo likelihood analysis based on
human mobility.  BMC Med 2009, 7:45.Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published  immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
BMC Medicine 2009, 7:81 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/81
Page 7 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/81/prepub